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NATURAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PRIVATIZATION: A 
COMMENT ON PROFESSOR ROSE 
ERIC R. CLAEYS* 
Professor Rose is to be commended for her choice of topic.1  Practically, 
international development policy is important, and theoretically, it raises issues 
that American property scholarship tends to overlook.  Property scholars, quite 
naturally, tend to gravitate toward the hard chestnuts that test the limits of any 
theory of property—nuisance, the lines between public and private property, 
commons and anti-commons problems, and so forth.  In these areas, again 
quite naturally, scholars take for granted that they can fine-tune the relations 
between competing stakeholders without affecting the basic function of 
property—to secure the connection between what one reaps and what one 
sows.  That most urgent function reasserts itself, by contrast, when countries 
embark on, to use Professor Rose’s term, a program of “privatization.”2  It is 
always useful for a community of property scholars to get back to basics, and 
Professor Rose is to be commended for encouraging us to do so. 
Professor Rose is also to be commended for making many constructive 
suggestions about how development policy might avoid some obvious pitfalls 
in its protection and regulation of property.  To take just a few examples, I find 
quite sensible many of her suggestions about regulating common carriers,3 
protecting drug patents,4 and property’s tendency to civilize or undermine civil 
society.5  The following musings should thus not be confused for serious 
disagreement with the main intentions of her paper. 
Nevertheless, I do wish to raise several questions about different aspects of 
Professor Rose’s argument.  In general, my questions come from my vantage 
point—specifically my familiarity with natural-law/natural-rights property 
theory from the period Rose describes as “old . . . going back to the eighteenth 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University.  Thanks to Joel Goldstein and Carol Rose 
for inviting me to comment on Professor Rose’s paper.  Thanks to Tom West for helpful 
comments. 
 1. See Carol M. Rose, Privatization—The Road to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691 
(2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. at 707–10, 719. 
 4. See id. at 715–16. 
 5. See id. at 718–20. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
722 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:721 
century and before.”6  (In general, throughout this Comment, I will refer to 
these thinkers as “classical liberals.”)  In some cases, I read many of the early 
moderns, like Smith, Locke, and their American students differently from 
Professor Rose, and draw correspondingly different conclusions about what 
those students might have to say about similar problems in Third World 
development now.  In others, I suspect that natural-law/natural-rights theory 
provides a useful heuristic for considering more deeply than Professor Rose 
does some of the theoretical issues raised by her survey. 
Before proceeding, let me hasten to add that this Comment will raise more 
questions than it answers, and suggest more than it proves.  I am not now ready 
to answer some of the questions I will raise with appropriate academic rigor, 
and even if I could, this Lecture is Professor Rose’s stage, not mine.  Even so, I 
offer these suggestions in the spirit of focusing more precisely on the urgent 
questions Professor Rose has raised. 
I.  NATURAL-LAW/NATURAL-RIGHTS PROPERTY THEORY 
Let me begin by briefly recounting the basics of natural-law/natural-rights 
theory as it relates to property.  Natural-law/natural-rights theory presumes that 
the overriding objects of civil society are to secure and to order the conditions 
in which citizens can enjoy a moral state of freedom known as “natural 
liberty.”  As explained by James Wilson, a drafter of the Constitution, member 
of the first Congress, and early Associate Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, 
“natural liberty” refers to a person’s right “to exercise his power for his own 
happiness . . . in such a manner, and upon such objects, as his inclination and 
judgment shall direct; provided he does no injury to others; and provided more 
publick [sic] interests do not demand his labours.”7  Natural property rights are 
the rights to which a citizen is entitled after accounting for the limits imposed 
by her responsibility to do no injury to others and to labor for overriding public 
interests.  Generally, “property” recognizes in owners a zone of free action as 
wide as possible after accounting for these moral obligations.  The width of the 
free action maximizes owners’ control over their assets.  Such control makes 
owners secure that they can use their assets for their own chosen ends and 
needs.  That security, in turn, encourages owners to invest their time, talent, 
and industrious passions into their assets—in a word, to sow in the expectation 
that they may reap.  Thus, when John Locke traced the moral foundations of 
property in his Second Treatise, he insisted that “God gave the world . . . to the 
use of the industrious and rational, (and labour was to be his title to it),”8 and 
 
 6. Rose, supra note 1, at 700. 
 7. 1 JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 227, 242 (Robert 
Green McCloskey ed., 1967). 
 8. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 34 (C. B. Macpherson ed., 1980) 
(1690) (emphasis omitted). 
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that “[t]he measure of property nature has well set by the extent of men’s 
labour and the conveniencies of life.”9  U.S. Supreme Court Justice William 
Patterson explained, in the 1795 case Van Horne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 
perhaps the most comprehensive American restatement of natural-rights 
takings principles: 
Men have a sense of property: Property is necessary to their subsistence, and 
correspondent to their natural wants and desires; its security was one of the 
objects, that induced them to unite in society.  No man would become a 
member of a community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest 
labor and industry.10 
Under the law of nature, then, “property” refers to the web of rights and 
obligations that maximizes such freedom and incentive to labor.  By contrast, 
“regulations” refer to the positive-law rules that define, protect, and order 
property.  They protect property where it deserves to be protected by natural 
law.  They may circumscribe property uses that must be limited out of respect 
for other natural rights.  Or, they may re-order property where doing so 
redounds to the joint benefit of all affected owners.11 
However, even if we assume that natural-rights principles are good enough 
for government work, this portrait still begs one huge practical problem: How 
should the positive laws of property be written in cases in which two 
competing uses of property collide?  Different authorities have stated the 
answer in different ways, but the basic claim was the same: Since property’s 
natural end is to secure to a person the fruits of her industry, in cases in which 
property rights do not compete with other legitimate goods, the positive law 
must tap and encourage that industry as much as possible.  In the easy cases, 
property rules must simply guarantee to each owner a zone of control and free 
action proportionate to the asset in question.  In the hard cases, non-owners 
may plausibly claim to be stakeholders in someone else’s asset.  In those cases, 
depending on how the asset is used, the law may reverse the basic presumption 
that the owner has general dominion over the property to encourage and secure 
the contributing labor of the stakeholder. 
This last point is subtle but important.  John Locke made it in an oft-
overlooked passage of the Second Treatise.  Locke concluded that “numbers of 
men are to be preferred to largeness of dominion” because goods take their 
“value from human industry.”12  Important here: “[T]hat prince, who shall be 
so wise and godlike, as by established laws of liberty to secure protection and 
 
 9. Id. § 36, at 22 (emphasis omitted). 
 10. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795). 
 11. See Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 877, 886–92 (2004); Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property 
Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1566–74 (2003). 
 12. LOCKE, supra note 8, at § 42. 
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encouragement to the honest industry of mankind, against the oppression of 
power and narrowness of party, will quickly be too hard for his neighbours.”13  
Although the nuances of Locke’s argument deserve closer study, Locke is 
clearly suggesting that the proper object of civil legislation is to make the 
difficult practical judgments to determine, for any species of property, which 
combinations of rights and duties, among which owners and other lesser 
stakeholders, will best promote “the honest industry of mankind.”14  Now, this 
general command begs all sort of difficult questions—practical, empirical, and 
conceptual—as Locke himself admitted when he suggested that only a “wise 
and godlike” prince was capable of writing the necessary laws.  Be that as it 
may, Locke pointed here toward the general principle by which natural-
law/natural-rights property resolves hard questions about the creation and 
delineation of property. 
II.  PRIVATIZATION 
This recapitulation prompts three doubts about Professor Rose’s paper.  
The first is a challenge to Professor Rose’s “typology of privatizations.”15  
“Privatization” is a slippery term.  Rightly, Professor Rose recognizes that she 
speaks “[v]ery roughly” when she uses the term “privatization.”16  She is, after 
all, trying to take the term as it comes in practice and render it as coherent as 
theory allows.  While international-development specialists may know 
privatization when they see it, they may not be able to define “privatization” 
rigorously enough to satisfy the expectations of property theorists.  Because 
the natural-law/natural-rights approach defines what “property” and its 
“regulation” mean with more specificity, that approach may be able to provide 
a more focused account of what “privatization” is and when it is appropriate 
than many other viable theories of property. 
It helps to unpackage the relevant issues in three steps.  The most 
fundamental question asks whether a certain asset is properly classified as 
private property, a public commons, or private property publici juris, that is to 
say, affected with a public interest.  Natural-law/natural-rights theory does not 
favor making every asset into a private asset.  Privatization is the right strategy 
when private ownership helps to connect industry to its fruits and therefore to 
unleash the value of labor.  But a more public solution makes sense when all 
can use the asset in common to apply labor on their more private assets. 
Blackstone illustrates the tension.  On one hand, he famously described 
“property” as that “sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of 
 
 13. Id. (emphasis added). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Rose, supra note 1, at 694–98. 
 16. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] NATURAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PRIVATIZATION 725 
any other individual in the universe.”17  On the other hand, in a less-familiar 
passage, he also recognized that “there are some few things, which 
notwithstanding the general introduction and continuance of property, must 
still unavoidably remain in common . . . [including] light, air, and 
water . . . .”18  Read as broad guides rather than literal rules, Blackstone’s 
contrasts follow the value of labor.  Consider water as just one example, and 
leave room for exceptions.  In a temperate jurisdiction, like Blackstone’s 
England, water has many common uses, including recreation and especially 
transport.  In an arid jurisdiction, water is relatively useless for transport and 
other common functions; it therefore makes sense to switch to a prior-
appropriation regime—a privatizing regime—to encourage the labor needed to 
appropriate scarce water. 
These variations make quite tricky the phenomena Professor Rose 
describes as “divestiture” and “enablement.”19  In practice, divestiture is 
usually sound, for many developing countries must transfer competitive assets 
out of state ownership to gain the benefits from labor and industry.  In theory, 
however, regulators must at least consider the possibility that a particular state-
owned asset ought properly to remain in common hands; if so, then they must 
consider the subsidiary question whether it is more expedient for the state to 
own it or to assign it to a common carrier regulated publici juris.  These fine 
questions make vexing the regulation of telecommunications and waterworks, 
two examples considered by Rose.20  Similar problems arise with 
“enablement” when a state must draw the line between private and public in 
intellectual property.  When American patent law treats useful, novel, and non-
obvious inventions as private property for a limited term,21 it tacitly assigns to 
the commons things that are not inventions and inventions that are obvious, not 
useful, or not novel.  Copyright assigns to the private sphere the expression of 
ideas but reserves to the commons pure ideas.22 
Once assets have been classified as private, public, or publici juris, the 
next inquiry asks whether any third parties have rights strong enough to count 
as “property” in those assets.  Adverse possession illustrates here.  Normally, 
as Professor Rose recognizes, titling is an extremely simple way of 
“recognizing” private property.23  But what of adverse possession?  On one 
hand, it encourages “honest industry” by reallocating title from one who is not 
mixing her labor with her land to one who is; on the other, it seems to ratify 
 
 17. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 2 (facsimile ed. 
1979) (1765–69). 
 18. Id. at 14. 
 19. Rose, supra note 1, at 696–98. 
 20. See id. at 696. 
 21. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 22. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 23. See Rose, supra note 1, at 694. 
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theft.  Locke’s “wise and godlike” prince earns his keep here by relying on 
observation and experience to determine which particular regime, if applied 
generally, is most likely to encourage industry. 
Once ownership rights have been recognized and distributed, the last 
inquiry asks in what circumstances private property is properly “regulated.”  
This inquiry goes to the heart of the “deregulation” Professor Rose mentions.  
Again, in practice, most “deregulation” in developing countries is sensible, 
because deregulation usually refers to the process by which the state lifts 
controls on competition in industries that are competitive.  In the first third of 
the twentieth century, American courts used natural-law/natural-rights 
principles to inform substantive due process doctrine and to invalidate many 
Progressive and New Deal programs that required firms to acquire certificates 
of convenience and necessity to compete in competitive businesses.24  
American legislators and regulators repudiated similar programs in the 1970s 
and 1980s as academic economists encouraged deregulation.25  To the extent 
that developing countries are lifting similar controls on similarly competitive 
businesses, it is eminently sensible to “privatize” by “deregulating.” 
But in natural-law/natural-rights parlance, it is legitimate to “regulate” to 
prevent owners’ use rights from doing what Wilson called “injury to others.”  
On this ground, many health, safety, and environmental protections are 
sensible regulations for protecting the public, understood as the collective 
individual and natural rights of its citizenry.  That broad description of ends 
leaves hard questions of means—what combination of abatement, taxes, fines, 
tradeable pollution permits, and other tools best prevent the harms in question.  
Health, safety, and environmental restrictions also raise sticky issues between 
nations because they can be co-opted for domestic protectionist reasons, as 
Professor Rose aptly notes.26  But a rigorous theory of property must be able to 
mark off which kinds of “regulation” are forbidden, which are acceptable, and 
how the acceptable ought to proceed consistent with the overriding purposes of 
property ownership. 
III.  OBLIGATIONS IN THE STATE OF NATURE AND IN CIVIL SOCIETY 
My second doubt about Professor Rose’s analysis relates to her use of 
Locke, and particularly Locke’s state-of-nature theory.  After surveying the 
lessons from several decades of privatization, she concludes that they tend to 
call into doubt Locke’s arguments that property is pre-political: that it has 
“priority” because it “alone predates, and justifies government.”27  In 
 
 24. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 275–77 (1932). 
 25. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1329–30 (1998). 
 26. See Rose, supra note 1, at 695–96. 
 27. Id. at 701. 
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particular, she suggests, a titling law “is an assurance of property that does not 
predate the state”; it is instead “a creature of the state,” and it “can scarcely be 
justified on the classic ground that it simply reinforces a form of pre-existing 
property that is somehow natural to humans.”28 
Although it would take several articles to confirm them, I have strong 
doubts that this description is fair to Locke or other classical-liberal property 
theorists.  To begin with, this argument misunderstands how Locke (and other 
classical liberals) understood “nature.”  At bottom, “nature” referred to the 
external world separate from man.  Quite often, it referred to the passions and 
faculties that motivate and limit human action.  At the top, “nature” set the 
prescriptive standards for human happiness and excellence that human reason 
can discern after observing how humans behave and become happy.  These 
senses are confused, for instance, when Professor Rose cites Locke (and Elinor 
Ostrom) loosely to support the “easy assumption” that “privatization protects 
‘natural’ pre-existing property rights.”29 
To be fair to Rose and others, early moderns and their American students 
often shifted quickly from one of these meanings to the other, and it can be 
hard for people not steeped in the natural-law/natural-rights tradition to keep 
up with the variations.  Even so, I strongly doubt that Locke, his 
contemporaries, or his American students referred to “property” as “natural” in 
the sense that people develop property institutions as inevitably and universally 
as human nature drives babies to learn to walk.  Nor did they mean it in the 
sense that the positive law ought to legislate and reinforce customary patterns 
of use and ownership.  Rather, “nature” here meant: If a society wants to 
generate laws and cultural norms that will insure the happiness of its citizens as 
far as is practically possible, it ought to write property laws that maximize the 
return that individual industry gets from property.  This sense is fairly clear in 
the writings of many American jurists (though, again, there was considerable 
variation among them).30  To take just one example, as James Wilson put it, 
“True it is, that, by the municipal law, some things may be prohibited, which 
are not prohibited by the law of nature; but equally true it is, that, under a 
government which is wise and good, every citizen will gain more liberty . . . by 
the limitation of other men’s freedom, than he can lose by the diminution of his 
own.”31  For Wilson, “nature” sets standards for a sound understanding of 
freedom and happiness; it sets a prescriptive standard that citizens may or may 
not choose to attain. 
 
 28. Id. at 703–04. 
 29. Id. at 701–02. 
 30. To appreciate some of the variations, consider Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Law, 
Natural Rights, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 922–37 (1993), and the original 
sources cited therein. 
 31. 2 WILSON, supra note 7, at 587–88. 
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From this perspective, legal titling programs do not refute the arguments of 
Locke and other state-of-nature theorists as much as Professor Rose suggests.32  
It does not matter whether titling laws pre-date the state.  It does matter that a 
person’s natural right to labor takes priority to and sets a standard for judging 
the actions of the state.  Titling laws deserve respect because they secure the 
right to labor in land and other important assets. 
To be sure, the understanding presented here can be challenged.  Perhaps 
the rights people enjoy in the state of nature are morally irrelevant to the rights 
they enjoy in civil society, as Liam Murphy, Thomas Nagel, and Andre 
Marmor argued recently.33  While I cannot address this argument fully here, let 
me say that, to explore it fully, one would need to be careful how to portray the 
relation between the state of nature and civil society in different natural-
law/natural-rights teachings.  At one extreme, some natural-law/natural-rights 
theorists—contrary to Rose’s generalizations, and contrary to Murphy, Nagel, 
and Marmor’s portrait of Locke—did not follow state-of-nature teachings.  For 
them, man was a political being, he was naturally inclined toward political 
society, and such a society could be judged by the extent to which it secured 
his natural rights with its positive laws and its law enforcement.  Thus, 
Vermont jurist Nathaniel Chipman held that “[t]he right of property itself, still 
remains founded in natural principle[s],” and the positive laws “serve only to 
bring the subjects of property within those principles.”34 
In the middle, some natural-law/natural-rights theorists viewed political 
society as a bargain to get out of the state of nature—and then concluded that 
the society’s laws needed to be understood to give citizens the benefit of that 
bargain.  The most prominent authority to take this view was Blackstone, who 
defined “privileges” and “immunities” as civil laws designed to secure to 
individuals the greatest share of rights to which they are naturally endowed as 
is consistent with the requirements of organized political and social life: 
[P]rivate immunities . . . will appear, from what has been premised, to be 
indeed no other, than either that residuum of natural liberty, which is not 
required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience; or else 
those civil privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the 
natural liberties so given up by individuals.35 
 
 32. See Rose, supra note 1, at 700–01. 
 33. See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 74 (2002); 
Andre Marmor, On the Right to Private Property and Entitlement to One’s Income, 2 (UNIV. OF 
SOUTHERN CAL. LAW SCHOOL PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. 04-15, 2004), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=567784. 
 34. NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT: A TREATISE ON FREE 
INSTITUTIONS 75 (Burlington, Va., Edward Smith 1833). 
 35. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 17, at 125.  See generally Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What 
Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents: Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical 
Context (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Saint Louis University Law Journal). 
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At the other extreme, John Locke certainly did contrast the state of nature 
to civil society.  It would take elaboration more detailed than I can provide 
here to sort through the relevant interpretations and criticisms of Locke’s 
defense of property.  My sense, however, is that the lessons one learns about 
property in the state of nature are considerably more relevant to civil law than 
Professor Rose’s portrait suggests.  The main thesis of Chapter 5 of the Second 
Treatise is that the world is for the “use of the industrious and rational,” not for 
“the fancy and covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious,”36 because 
“labour indeed . . . puts the difference of value in everything.”37  This lesson is 
made clearest in the state of nature, where customs, institutions, and laws do 
not complicate analysis, and Locke’s treatment clearly indicates that the labor 
theory of value is directly ethically binding in lands and societies still governed 
by the state of nature.  Locke, however, is more circumspect with respect to 
civil society.  He anticipates the criticisms laid out above, for he acknowledges 
that people can “by consent . . . set out the bounds of their distinct territories, 
and agree on limits between them and their neighbors, and by laws within 
themselves, settle[] the properties of those of the same society.”38  As a result, 
he anticipates Rose (as Rose has acknowledged elsewhere), for he concedes 
that the laws of nature may not be directly binding in civil society, not if the 
citizens consent to a different set of laws.39 
Even so, the state of nature’s teachings is still relevant to civil society.  
They are relevant morally, for the principles evident in the state of nature are 
principles that a humane people would want to consider while determining to 
what laws they will consent.  They are also relevant for reasons of political 
expediency and justice.  Locke alludes to the expediency when he suggests that 
“that prince who shall be so wise and godlike as by established laws of liberty 
to secure protection and encouragement to the honest industry of mankind 
against the oppression of power and narrowness of party will quickly be too 
hard for his neighbors.“40  That prince’s laws should protect and encourage 
property not because doing so is morally required, but because doing so 
increases national power.  Later, however, he suggests that the protection of 
property is required by justice: 
[W]herever the power, that is put in any hands for the government of the 
people, and the preservation of their properties, is applied to other ends, and 
 
 36. LOCKE, supra note 8, § 34, at 21–22. 
 37. Id. § 40, at 25 (emphasis omitted). 
 38. Id. § 38, at 24 (emphasis omitted). 
 39. See Carol M. Rose, Property as Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 335 
(1996). 
 40. LOCKE, supra note 8, § 42, at 26 (emphasis added). 
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made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the arbitrary and 
irregular commands of those that have it; there it presently becomes tyranny.41 
More needs to be said to tease out how much Locke thinks it is advantageous 
for society to protect property, how much it is morally obligatory for it to do 
so, and how much of this is just hortatory.  Nevertheless, one way or another, 
Locke’s teachings are still relevant for organizing a civil society.  More 
generally, Rose and other contemporary property theorists need to be more 
sensitive not to conflate “natural” with “universal” or “customary” in the 
writings of Locke and other natural-law/natural-rights theorists. 
IV.  PROPERTY, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY 
My last reservation relates to a series of observations that Professor Rose 
makes about property and political morality.  Rose considers three separate 
arguments that, in different ways, analyze how property shapes culture and 
politics.  One is the “distraction” argument: “[I]f property can be made secure 
and trade made easy, citizens are likely to become more interested in making 
money, and correspondingly less interested in killing one another for religious 
or clan-related or nationalistic reasons.”42  Another is the “symbolic” 
argument, that property provides “an education in what it means to be a rights-
bearer.”43  The last is the “civilizing” argument: “Property and commerce are 
central rights because they educate people in the patterns of give-and-take on 
which democracy depends.”44 
Professor Rose deserves credit for considering these possibilities seriously, 
for they are often overlooked in contemporary property scholarship.  Different 
political regimes expect different things from property.  Feudal English courts 
construed the estates and future interests in land to preserve land as a tool for 
keeping dynastic families together, while early-modern English courts 
reconsidered the same estates and interests with a view toward promoting 
commerce.  By the same token, property ownership influences the general 
culture.  Political theorist Tom West likes to point out that the United States 
has relatively few deep disputes about property ownership in large part because 
Americans who do not now own property expect that they can get it by 
working.45  The American Founders focused on such connections between law 
and culture.  Many organized religions do so now in their social teachings, 
including the Catholic Church of which Saint Louis University is a part.  
 
 41. Id. § 201, at 102. 
 42. Rose, supra note 1, at 710. 
 43. Id. at 714. 
 44. Id. at 718. 
 45. See THOMAS G. WEST, VINDICATING THE FOUNDERS: RACE, SEX, CLASS, AND JUSTICE 
IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA 44–46 (1997). 
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Comparatively speaking, however, contemporary property scholarship does not 
engage these themes with the same interest. 
I have one minor qualification and one more serious reservation about 
Rose’s treatment of these cultural themes.  The qualification is this: When 
Rose cites counter-examples against the general relations she suggests, she is 
not saying anything that would have surprised Locke, Montesquieu, or any 
other of the major classical liberals.  Rose cites hard cases in which property 
disputes trigger contentious and intractable political conflicts: fights over the 
allocation of public water in Bolivia, racial discrimination against ethnic 
Chinese in Indonesia, rent-control fights in the United States, and fights over 
intellectual property here and internationally.46  I read Rose not to be 
suggesting that these exceptions undermine the general rule that ownership 
improves culture, but rather that this rule needs to be understood reasonably.  I 
doubt any major classical liberal thinker would have disagreed.  For example, 
Publius expected Americans to be largely free from deep divisions on the basis 
of religion, language, history, or nationality,47 but he also described property 
regulation as “the most common and durable source of factions.”48 
So understood, both Rose and major classical liberal thinkers call for laws, 
constitutional provisions, and political institutions to act as counter-weights 
against some of the more likely sources of division over property.  As Rose 
suggests, it is probably impossible to eliminate all political factions associated 
with patents or common-carrier utilities.  Because owners’ sunk costs are high, 
consumers have strong incentives to lobby for laws that drive owners to 
produce at the (low) marginal cost of production, not at a price that recoups 
owners’ investments.  Politically speaking, this problem probably cannot be 
eliminated, only mitigated.  One part of the solution is to institute 
constitutional provisions guaranteeing protection for utilities and patents.  In 
the United States, courts have used due process and takings principles to do 
just that.49  However, as Gregory Alexander suggests in a forthcoming book, 
the better solution may be to change the political culture: If the culture does 
not respect property, political parties and legislators will flout constitutional 
guarantees anyway.50  But since it is usually impossible to reform culture from 
the top down, it is crucial for policy makers to identify the political and legal 
institutions that best appreciate property rights, and then shift control over 
 
 46. See Rose, supra note 1, at 708–711, 715–16. 
 47. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 5–6 (John Jay) (Clinton R. Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 45, 47 (James Madison) (Clinton R. Rossiter ed., 1999). 
 49. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601–19 (1944); Smyth 
v. Ames, 18 S. Ct. 418, 424, 426 (1898) (protecting utilities against confiscatory ratemaking); 
McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 210–22 (1843) (protecting patent holders against 
substantive changes to their patent rights). 
 50. See Gregory Alexander, The Global Debate Over Constitutional Property (June 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Saint Louis University Law Journal). 
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precarious forms of property to those institutions.  Brian Levy and Pablo 
Spiller have highlighted this approach in a book-length collection of studies of 
telecommunications sectors in different countries.51  Their case studies show 
how different institutions may be better or worse equipped to provide the 
credible commitments telecommunications companies require, depending on 
how well-educated their officers are, on how strong political parties are, how 
strong the rule of law is, and so forth.52 
My reservation is this: I strongly doubt that any of the major classical 
liberals gave property as much priority as Professor Rose’s treatment 
suggests.53  They agreed that property deserved to be protected.  In their time, 
they agreed that it needed to be protected far more than it had been protected in 
a world dominated by kings, the feudal system, and guilds.  In our time, they 
would probably agree with libertarians and libertarian-conservatives that 
property should be protected more than it is under current law. 
Even so, I wonder whether it is helpful or accurate to say, as Professor 
Rose does repeatedly, that the major classical liberal thinkers gave property 
“priority” over other rights.  The American Founders who were so enamored of 
property also were enamored of using moral philosophy and religion to 
inculcate the principles and habits of republican virtue.  One can see as much 
in the Northwest Ordinance, which legislated on behalf of the Northwest 
Territories: “Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good 
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education 
shall forever be encouraged.”54  The same Adam Smith who wrote The Wealth 
of Nations55 also wrote The Theory of the Moral Sentiments, the first sentence 
of which reads: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently 
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and 
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it 
except the pleasure of seeing it.”56The same can be said of Locke.  True, John 
Locke is most famous for his discourse on property in the Second Treatise.  
But this justification comes after the First Treatise, where “the positive [l]aws 
of the [s]ociety” are “made conformable to the [l]aws of [n]ature, for the public 
good,” which is defined explicitly in reference to “the good of every particular 
 
 51. REGULATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMITMENT: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller eds., 1996). 
 52. See generally id. 
 53. See Rose, supra note 1, at 701 (challenging property’s “centrality”); Rose, supra note 39, 
at 333 (challenging property’s status “as the linchpin, the pivot, the central right”). 
 54. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States, North-West of 
the River Ohio, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789). 
 55. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS (William Benton, pub. 1952) (1776). 
 56. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 9 (D. D. Raphael & A. L. Macfie 
eds., 1976) (1759). 
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[m]ember of that [s]ociety, as far as can by common [r]ules, it can be provided 
for.”57  Locke also wrote Some Thoughts Concerning Education, which 
instructs parents how to educate their children (men and women) to be self-
restrained, generous, just, and courageous.58  He also wrote The 
Reasonableness of Christianity, which taught that reason and revelation 
complement one another in teaching men the same set of earthly duties.59  
Most important, modern scholars tend to forget that Locke influenced not only 
secular Enlightenment intellectuals, but also clergy, who then taught their 
congregations in England and especially in America.60 
Again, these reservations do not detract from any of Professor Rose’s 
specific arguments about the problems property creates.  But they do call into 
question whether those thinkers expected property to carry the weight 
Professor Rose suggests when she reads them to give property “priority over 
other rights.”61  To go by the Northwest Ordinance, the early Congress put its 
bets on “the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, which form 
the basis whereon these republics, their laws and constitutions are erected.”62  
Similarly, while Locke has been read for a long time in a manner that stresses 
the acquisitive materialism in his thought, ultimately he grounds the basis of 
civil government in “men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and 
infinitely wise maker . . . [a]nd being furnished with like faculties, sharing all 
in one community of nature.”63  Civil equality—and republican government—
become possible only when “there cannot be supposed any such subordination 
among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for 
one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our’s [sic].”64 
If the Northwest Ordinance and these passages of Locke are reliable 
guides, international-development specialists had better be leery of relying too 
much on property rights and institutions to moderate politics in developing 
countries.  Property rights and property-respecting institutions may be 
necessary, but they may not be sufficient.  Property cannot do its work unless a 
nation embraces in its laws and in its culture a basic respect for civil and 
 
 57. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 92, at 228 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) 
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religious equality.  Property may unleash acquisitive passions that roil a 
nation’s politics or enervate its culture.  The major classical liberal thinkers 
were keenly aware of these dangers, and considered seriously how social 
instincts, moral duties, and organized religion might serve as counterweights to 
property’s atomizing tendencies.  Although more would need to be said to 
trace out how these thinkers understood the relations among property, society, 
and morality, we must be careful not to overstate the extent to which these 
thinkers emphasized property. 
 
